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The Elusive Right to Reinstatement
under the Family Medical Leave Act
BY STACY A. HICKOX'
magine that you work for an employer covered by the Family
Medical Leave Act ("FMLA") and seek to take leave after the birth
of a child or to care for an ill parent. You understand your leave is unpaid
and limited to twelve weeks, but you are thankful for this relatively new
opportunity to take time off from work for personal reasons. Yet, imagine
your surprise when you return to work only to find that your position has
been eliminated or that your employer has decided that your position
needed to be filled while you were on leave. This experience would, at the
very least, cause you to doubt whether the FMLA is living up to its promise
to "balance the demands of the workplace with the needs" of employees
to take leave for eligible medical conditions and compelling family
reasons.'
* Visiting Professor, Michigan State University Detroit College of Law. J.D.
1988, University of Pennsylvania. Copyright © 2002 Stacy Hickox.
'29 U.S.C. § 2601(b) (1999).
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The FMLA entitles eligible employees to a maximum of twelve weeks
of unpaid leave for health-related reasons,2 and provides for the right of
reinstatement so that an employee can return to work after taking leave.3
Yet, since the FMLA's passage nearly ten years ago, courts have curtailed
this right of reinstatement. Courts have placed the burden on employees to
prove that the employer did not have a legitimate reason to refuse
reinstatement, while limiting consideration of proof that the reason offered
by the employer is really a pretext for adverse treatment based on the
employee's use of FMLA leave.' In addition, while the FMLA provides for
reinstatement to the same or an equivalent position, an employer may be
able to manipulate the availability of equivalent work with an underlying
motive to deny the right of reinstatement.'
To fulfill its promise, the FMLA should be interpreted to allow an
employee a more meaningful right of reinstatement after taking FMLA
leave. The courts can do this by interpreting the FMLA's positive right of
reinstatement as the rule rather than the exception, and by adhering to the
Department of Labor's placement of the burden on the employer to
establish the right to claim an exception to that right. Moreover, even
though intent is not an element of entitlement to the right of reinstatement,
employees who have taken FMLA leave should be given an opportunity to
establish that the employer's proffered reason for not reinstating the
employee is a pretext for denying the right. Only then will employees enjoy
the meaningful right to reinstatement that the FMLA envisioned.
As some courts have recognized, employees should be able to protect
their right to reinstatement by disproving the legitimacy of employers'
reasons for refusing to reinstate them.6 Employees should be able to use
2 Reasons for leave include leave because of the employee's own serious
health condition that makes the employee unable to perform the functions of his or
her position, and caring for a child, spouse, or parent with a serious health
condition. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C)-(D) (1999).
3 29 U.S.C. § 2614 (a)(1) (1999).
4 See, e.g., Kohls v. Beverly Enters. Wis., Inc., 259 F.3d 799, 804-06 (7th Cir.
2001) (holding that the plaintiff did not meet her burden and that showing a pretext
did not "necessarily satisfy the employee's burden").
5 Brenlla v. LaSorsa Buick Pontiac Chevrolet, Inc., No. 00 Civ. 5207, 2002
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9358, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. May 28, 2002) (ruling the "sole
determining factor" for eliminating, the plaintiff's position was due to her FMLA
leave).
6 See, e.g., Smith v. Diffee Ford-Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 298 F.3d 955, 962
(10th Cir. 2002) (holding that plaintiff had sufficient evidence to show continued
employment "had she not taken FMLA leave").
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evidence of intent to challenge employers' failure to reinstate based on
employees' performance, inability to perform the duties of the position, or
an employers' elimination of their position. Employers may mask their
intent to punish employees for taking FMLA leave by failing to reinstate
them to equivalent positions, or by designating them as "key employees"7
who are not entitled to reinstatement. Without an opportunity to challenge
employers' reasons with such evidence of intent, employers can easily
escape their positive obligation to reinstate employees after their FMLA
leave and consequently frustrate the purposes of the Act.
This Article explores the decisions of various appellate courts
reviewing reinstatement claims under the FMLA. Part I reviews the
relevant provisions and legislative history of the FMLA.8 Part II discusses
the various allocations by the courts of the burden of proof under the
FMLA.9 The role of intent is examined in Part III, which highlights courts
that have allowed enployees to present evidence of employers' underlying
intent to refuse to reinstate because the employee has taken FMLA leave.1"
This discourse on the role of intent is carried over in Part IV where
comparable provisions of the Equal Pay Act are analyzed.1' Parts V'2 and
VV3 consider attempts by employers to avoid their reinstatement obliga-
tions based on reasons unrelated to the use of FMLA and the employee's
inability to perform, respectively. Part VII examines the employer's duty
to reinstate those returning from FMLA leave to either the same or an
"equivalent" position. 4 The final section of the Article outlines the
FMLA's "key employee" exception to the duty to reinstate. 5
I. THE FMLA's REQUIREMENTS
The FMLA entitles eligible employees to a maximum of twelve weeks
of unpaid leave for health-related reasons. 6 The FMLA was enacted "to
'A key employee according to the FMLA is "a salaried eligible employee who
is among the highest paid 10 percent of the employees employed by the employer
within 75 miles of the facility at which the employee is employed." 29 U.S.C. §
2614(b)(2) (2002).
a See infra notes 16-43 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 44-102 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 103-42 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 143-64 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 165-92 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 193-234 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 235-75 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 276-98 and accompanying text.
16 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (1999); see supra note 2.
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balance the demands of the workplace with the needs of families" and "to
entitle employees to take reasonable leave for medical reasons." 7 These
purposes were based on findings that there was "inadequate job security for
employees who have serious health conditions that prevent them from
working for temporary periods."' 8 One court found that "[t]he FMLA was
enacted to help working men and women balance the conflicting demands
of work and personal life" by "recognizing that there will be times in a
person's life when that person is incapable of performing her work duties
for medical reasons."' 19
The FMLA also provides relief for families who are faced with issues
of child care or care for a parent. Congress found that 96% of fathers and
65% of mothers worked outside the home in 1993.20 This return to work by
mothers, combined with a rise of single families to 27% of all family
groups with children, forced employees to choose between caring for their
loved ones and retaining their employment.2 Congress considered the
overwhelming testimony of health care professionals illustrating the
benefits to families provided by having caregivers available for newborns,
children with illnesses, and parents in need of care.22 Before the enactment
of the FMLA, Congress found that approximately 11% of caregivers were
forced to quit or be fired because of their caregiving responsibilities. 23 The
authors of a U.S. Small Business Administration ("SBA") survey estimated
that 150,000 employees lost their jobs each year due to the lack of medical
leave.24 This survey, conducted prior to the passage of the FMLA, found
that 70% to 90% of employers only offered leave of a variable or unspeci-
fied length, which "offer[s] little security to employees if employers do not
guarantee some minimum length of leave. 25
Employee rights under the FMLA were not intended to be unlimited.
The Senate Report on the FMLA suggested that the FMLA would "help all
businesses maintain a minimum floor of protection for their employees
without jeopardizing or decreasing their competitiveness" and would
reduce the financial burden on the public sector, which typically supports
'7 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(1), (2) (1999).
8 Id. § 2601(a)(4).
'9 Price v. City of Fort Wayne, 117 F.3d 1022, 1024 (7th Cir. 1997).
20 S. REP. NO. 103-3, at 6 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 8.
2
1Id.a
22Id. at 9-11, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 11-13.
21 Id. at 11, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 13.
24 Id. at 14, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 17 (estimate by economists
Eileen Trzcinski and William Alpert).
25 Id.
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families that fail.26 Some information also suggests that allowance of family
leave could make employers more efficient and productive. A 1990 study
by the Southport Institute for Policy Analysis found that "'caregiving not
only causes stress for individuals, it may be a substantial drag on national
productivity.' ,27 Additionally, "'[i]n a period where shortages of skilled
labor are growing,"' the loss of 11% of caregiving employees, who have
left the labor force to provide care, has a significant effect on employers'
productivity.2" Testimony before Congress confirmed that voluntary
provisions of leave prior to the passage of FMLA not only lessened
employers' hiring costs, training costs, turnover rate, and absenteeism, but
also "command[ed] the respect and loyalty" of employees.2 9 The SBA study
specifically found that the loss of employees arising from the need to quit
to care for another or themselves cost employers from $1131 to $3152 per
employee, granting a leave request cost between $.97 and $97.78 per week
of leave; thus the FMLA was estimated to cost employers $6.70 per
employee per year.30 Similarly, a four state study found that a significant
majority of employers had not found the implementation of state family
leave statutes costly or burdensome.31
To fulfill these purposes, the FMLA places certain restrictions on an
employer's treatment of employees who seek leave inder FMLA provi-
sions. Under the FMLA, an employer cannot "interfer[e] with, restrain, or
deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise, any right provided."32 The
Act also prohibits an employer from "discharg[ing] or in any other manner
discriminat[ing] against any individual for opposing any practice made
261d. at 18, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 20. A study conducted by the
Institute for Women's Policy Research estimated "that workers without leave suffer
added unemployment and earnings losses after childbirth or illness because they
cannot return to their former jobs for total" annual losses of $607 million
(childbirth) and $12.2 billion (serious illness). Lack of such leave results in annual
costs for public programs such as welfare, supplemental security income, and
unemployment insurance of$108 million (parental leave) and $4.3 billion (medical
leave). Id.
27 d. at 7, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 9 (quoting Susan E. Foster &
Jack A. Brizius, Caring Too Much? American Women and the Nation's Caregiving
Crisis, in WOMEN ON THE FRONT LINES: MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF AN AGING
AMERICA (J. Allen & A. Pifer eds., 1993)).28 Id.
29 Id. at 12, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 15 (testimony of Geoffrey
Carter, small business owner).
30 Id. at 17, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 19.
31 Id. at 14, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 16.
32 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1) (1999).
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unlawful" by the FMLA.33 Such discrimination includes taking action
against employees because they have used FMLA leave.34 An employer
may not consider "the taking of FMLA leave as a negative factor in
employment actions, such as hiring, promotions, or disciplinary actions."35
In addition to these protections against discrimination, perhaps the most
important guarantee of the FMLA is the right of an employee to return to
work after taking leave.36 The FMLA provides that an employee "shall be
entitled, on return from leave (A) to be restored by the employer to the
position of employment held by the employee when the leave commenced;
or (B) to be restored to an equivalent position with equivalent employment
benefits, pay, and other terms and conditions of employment."37 Without
this right, an employee might be allowed to take the leave but would have
no job after using that leave. To protect this right of return, the FMLA
specifically provides that it is "unlawful for any employer to interfere with,
restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise, any right
provided."38 The right to reinstatement has been characterized as a
substantive right rather than an anti-discrimination provision.39 Thus, intent
is not relevant to an employee's ability to establish a FMLA violation for
failure to reinstate.4" If an employer refuses to reinstate an employee
returning from FMLA leave for any reason, then the employer has violated
the FMLA, unless the refusal to reinstate is otherwise allowed by the
statute.
This reinstatement right is limited by the FMLA's provision that an
employer need not provide any returning employee with "any right, benefit,
or position of employment other than any right, benefit or position to which
the employee would have been entitled" if the leave was not taken.4 This
limitation was included by Congress to ensure that employees' use of leave
and requests to return to work "did not unduly infringe on employers' needs
to operate their businesses efficiently and profitably."42 According to the
3Id. § 2615(a)(2).
14 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c) (2002).
35Id.
36 29 U.S.C. § 2614 (a)(1) (1999).
37 Id.
38 I d. § 2615(a)(1); see also King v. Preferred Technical Group, 166 F.3d 887,
891 (7th Cir. 1999).
39 See Snow v. HealthSouth Corp., No. IP00-0151, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
5534, at *51-52 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 21, 2001).
40 See King, 166 F.3d at 891.
41 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(3)(B).
42 Bachelder v. America West Airlines, Inc., 259 F.3d 1112, 1120 (9th Cir.
2001).
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Department of Labor, "[i]f the employee is unable to perform an essential
function of the position because of a physical or mental condition," the
employee has no right to job restoration.43
1I. BURDEN OF PROOF
The positive right to reinstatement provided by the FMLA suggests that
to state a claim an employee need only prove that the employer has refused
to reinstate him or her. Some courts have followed this allocation of proof,
allowing an employee to proceed to trial on the question of whether the
employer has presented evidence of some legitimate reason to excuse the
failure to reinstate." These courts recognize that the burden should be on
the employer to present evidence to support the affirmative defense that the
employee would not otherwise be entitled to reinstatement.45 Such an
allocation of burden relieves the employee of an obligation to discover
ways to invalidate the employer's reason for refusing to reinstate him and
allows the trier of fact to determine whether those reasons are legitimate.
Yet, other courts have put the burden on the employee to disprove the
legitimacy of employers' reasons for refusing to reinstate.46 This allocation
of burden tracks the framework first established in McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, under which a plaintiff can only establish a claim of
disparate treatment by carrying the burden of proving discriminatory intent
through the establishment of membership in a protected class, an adverse
action, and a connection between that membership and that adverse
action.47 The employer only needs to produce some evidence of a
"legitimate, nondiscriminatory" business reason for the adverse action.4 An
employee can only defeat a motion for summary judgment on a claim of
4 29 C.F.R. § 825.214(b) (2002).
44 See, e.g., Strickland v. Water Works Sewer Bd., 239 F.3d 1199, 1206-07
(1 Ith Cir. 2001) (holding that summary judgment is improper where the plaintiff
has sufficiently established an interference claim under FMLA).
45 See id. at 1208; see also 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(3) (listing the limitations to
reinstatement).
' See, e.g., Rice v. Sunrise Express, Inc., 209 F.3d 1008, 1018 (7th Cir. 2000)
(holding that the employee must convince the trier of fact that the benefit falls
under the provisions of FMLA). For an in-depth discussion of this approach, see
Michael L. Murphy, Note, The Federal Courts' Struggle with Burden Allocation
for Reinstatement Claims under the Family and Medical Leave Act: Breakdown of
the Rigid Dual Framework, 50 CATH. U. L. REV. 1081 (2001).
47 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); see also
Strickland, 239 F.3d at 1207.
48 McDonnellDouglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
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disparate treatment, if the employee presents enough evidence for a jury to
conclude that the employer is covering up a discriminatory purpose.4 9 Such
an allocation of proof inappropriately undermines employees' right to
reinstatement under the FMLA, consequently limiting the meaningfulness
of the right to take up to twelve weeks of leave.
The burden allocation can be particularly significant in a trial court's
decision on a motion for summary judgment. With a strong set of facts,
summary judgment might be denied under either the McDonnell Douglas
burden shifting analysis or the preponderance of the evidence test.5 The
significance of allocating the burden of persuasion can be illustrated by the
claim of a dietary aide for a hospital who was dismissed after taking FMLA
leave for stress and depression." The employing hospital alleged that the
aide had attempted to steal food from the hospital's kitchen the day before
her leave began and claimed that consequently she was not entitled to
reinstatement 2.5 This trial court wisely analogized to retaliatory discharge
claims and refused to grant summary judgment for the hospital based on
questions of fact as to the legitimacy of the employer's reasons for refusing
to reinstate her.53 The court noted that if the aide had alleged retaliatory
discharge, the evidence would also have precluded a summary judgment for
the hospital.54 If, instead, the burden had been placed on the employee, she
may have been unable to disprove the hospital's allegation that the food
was stolen.
There has been considerable disagreement as to which party should
bear the burden of proof when an employee is denied reinstatement after
FMLA leave. In its regulations, the Department of Labor stated:
An employer must be able to show that an employee would not otherwise
have been employed at the time reinstatement is requested in order to
deny restoration to employment.
'9 Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147 (2000). The
Reeves Court recognized that "once the employer's justification has been
eliminated, discrimination may well be the most likely alternative explanation,
especially since the employer is in the best position to put forth the actual reason
for its decision." Id.
50 See, e.g., Morgan v. FBL Fin. Servs., 178 F. Supp. 2d 1022, 1033-34 (S.D.
Iowa 2001) (holding genuine issues of material fact exist that preclude summary
judgment in an employee's action for retaliatory discrimination).
"' Blankenship v. Buchanan Gen. Hosp., 140 F. Supp. 2d 668, 670 (W.D. Va.
2001).
52 id.
53 Id. at 675.
54 Id.
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... An employer would have the burden of proving that an employee
would have been laid off during the FMLA leave period and, therefore,
would not be entitled to restoration."
This allocation of burden reflects the reality that an employee bringing the
claim may not have knowledge of the reasons warranting a denial of
reinstatement.
To .protect an employee's right of reinstatement against frivolous
reasons for denial, some courts have followed the Department of Labor
guidelines and required that an employer prove that an employee seeking
reinstatement would not otherwise have been employed at the time
reinstatement is requested.56 Under this method of proof, an employee
establishes the right to reinstatement by demonstrating by a preponderance
of the evidence that he or she is entitled to reinstatement as allowed under
the FMLA.57 The burden is then on the employer to avoid fulfilling its
reinstatement obligation by showing "an employee would not otherwise
have been employed at the time reinstatement is requested in order to deny
restoration to employment. 5 ' The employer then must prove that an
employee would have been laid off or otherwise dismissed during the
FMLA leave.59 The employer meets that burden if, for example, an
employer has included the position of an employee on leave as part of a
reduction in force.60
The Eleventh Circuit relied on this allocation of burden in Parris v.
Miami Herald Publishing Co. to deny a motion for summary judgment
where the employee presented evidence that the employer would not have
dismissed him if he had not taken leave, even though the Miami Herald did
reach the independent decision to eliminate his position.6 Parris had
worked as a Distribution Manager, and his particular department was being
restructured when he began his FMLA leave.62 Prior to his leave, Parris was
" 29 C.F.R. § 825.216(a) (2002).
56 See, e.g., O'Connor v. PCA Family Health Plan, Inc., 200 F.3d 1349, 1354
(11 th Cir. 2000) (holding that an employer has the burden to demonstrate that
discharge was inevitable despite FMLA leave).
" Strickland v. Water Works and Sewer Bd., 239 F.3d 1199, 1206-07 (1 lth
Cir. 2001).
58 O'Connor, 200 F.3d at 1354 (emphasis omitted).
59 Id.
60 id.
61 Parris v. Miami Herald, 216 F.3d 1298, 1302 (11 th Cir. 2000).
6 Id. at 1229-1300.
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told that he would have until the end of 1996 to find another position.63 Yet
on July 31, still during his leave, Parris was dismissed.' Even though Parris
had no greater rights than if he had not taken leave, the court reversed the
summary judgment for the employer because the facts "raised a reasonable
inference" that the employer would not have dismissed Parris if he had not
taken the leave. 5 It was not clear that any specific date had been chosen for
his dismissal prior to his leave.66 Additionally, other employees in his
department retained their position for a longer period.67 Because the
employer was not able to meet its burden of establishing that Parris would
not have been retained in his position if he had not taken leave, he was
entitled to a, trial on his right of reinstatement claim.
6
Similarly, the Strickland court reversed summary judgment for the
employer, even though the employee was unable to show retaliation,
because the employer could not establish as a matter of law that it would
have discharged Strickland if he had not been on FMLA leave. 69 The
employer failed to meet its burden because its dismissal letter did not
mention the reason, which was eventually given by the employer as
justification for the dismissal, and a reasonable jury could decide that
Strickland was dismissed because he took leave due to his health
condition.7" These decisions in favor of employees seeking to return to
work after their FMLA leave demonstrate the importance of putting the
burden on employers to prove the legitimacy of their reasons for refusing
to reinstate such employees.
The allocation of burden is also significant in the review of jury
verdicts. The Tenth Circuit upheld a jury verdict in favor of an employee
who was not reinstated, even though the jury was instructed that the
employer carried the burden of showing that the employee was not entitled
to reinstatement.7 That court quotes language from King v. Preferred
Technical Group, Inc. suggesting that the burden is on the employee,72 yet
63 Id. at 1300.
64 id.
651d. at 1302.
66 id.
67 id.
68 id.
69 Strickland v. Water Works Sewer Bd., 239 F.3d 1199, 1208 (11th Cir.
2001).
70 Id.
7' Smith v. Diffee Ford-Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 298 F.3d 955,963-64 (10th Cir.
2002).
72 Id. at 960 (quoting King v. Preferred Technical Group, 166 F.3d 887, 891
(7th Cir. 1999)).
[VOL. 91
FAMILY MEDICAL LEAVE ACT
ultimately relied on the Department of Labor's regulation placing the
burden on the employer.73 The employee in Smith had been disciplined for
failing to train some-other employees prior to taking FMLA leave.74 Yet the
court held that the jury was reasonable in finding in her favor under the
court's placement of the burden on the employer, where Smith was
dismissed during her leave after having long years of service and no serious
disciplinary actions taken against her prior to her leave, and her employer
had failed to emphasize the importance of the training or provide a timeline
for its completion." Thus, Smith was given the opportunity to challenge the
legitimacy of her employer's reasons offered to justify its refusal to
reinstate her. By placing the burden on the employer, the Smith court
respected the jury's finding that the employer's reason for failing to
reinstate Smith was not legitimate.
In Cross v. Southwest Recreational Industries, Inc., the court compared
the employer's burden in a reinstatement claim with an employer's burden
under the McDonnell Douglas analysis used for discrimination claims and
found that the employer's burden in defending its failure to reinstate is
"much greater ... because the employer has both the burden of production
and persuasion" to show that it would not have retained the employee
absent the leave.76 The Cross court compared placing this burden on the
employer to the burden placed on employers under the National Labor
Relations Act and the Equal Pay Act when asserting affirmative defenses
thereunder.77 The employer's motion for summary judgment was denied
despite the employer's contention that the plaintiff's position had been
temporary, where evidence showed the plaintiff's assigned duties had not
been completed at the time of her dismissal.7"
Relying on similar reasoning, a strong dissent in Rice v. Sunrise
Express, Inc. argues that the employer should have the burden of proving
13 Id. at 963 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 825.216(a)(1) (2002)). See also Drew v.
Waffle House, Inc., 571 S.E.2d 89, 92 (S.C. 2002) (burden on employer to prove
some other reason for failure to reinstate).
74 Smith, 298 F.3d at 958-59.
11Id. at 961.
76 Cross v. Southwest Recreational Indus., Inc., 17 F. Supp. 2d 1362, 1370
(N.D. Ga. 1998); judgment entered, No. 4:97-CV-01 18-HLM, 1998 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 19066 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 25, 1998) (holding genuine issues of material fact
existed regarding the employee's dismissal).
77Id. at 1370 (citing Maher Terminals, Inc. v. Director, Office Workers Comp.,
992 F.2d 1277, 1282-84 (3d Cir. 1993); Kouba v. Allstate Ins. Co., 691 F.2d 873,
875 (9th Cir. 1982)).
7 1Id. at 1370-71.
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that a statutory entitlement does not apply to one of its employees.79 Judge
Evans points out that the employer has control of the relevant evidence, and
therefore the employee who has taken FMLA leave should not be required
to prove that the employer would not have provided the benefit absent the
leave.80 This allocation of the burden makes the right to reinstatement a
meaningful one, rather than leaving the employee with an empty promise
that can be avoided through an employer's motion for summary judgment.
Not all courts have adhered to the guidance from the Department of
Labor that the employer should carry the burden of proving some legitimate
reason for failing to reinstate an employee returning from FMLA leave.
Instead, some circuit courts have put the burden on the employee to prove
his statutory entitlement of reinstatement.8 This allocation of the burden
was adopted from courts' consistent placement of the burden on the
employee when determining whether an employee had established a claim
of interference with rights under the FMLA.82 In King v. Preferred
Technical Group,83 Chaffin v. John H. Carter Co., 4 and Morgan v. Hilti,85
the employees alleged retaliation (that they had been dismissed or
disciplined because of their prior use of FMLA leave)86 while the plaintiffs
in Glecklen v. Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee87 and
Brungart v. Bellsouth Telecommunications, Inc. 88 asserted that they were
dismissed because they had requested leave.89 In each of these situations,
the employer's intent is important to determine whether the employee's
rights under the FMLA have been violated. Since an employee alleging
'9 Rice v. Sunrise Express, Inc., 209 F.3d 1008, 1019-20 (7th Cir. 2000)
(Evans, J., dissenting).
80 id.
8
1 See, e.g., Diaz v. Fort Wayne Foundry Corp., 131 F.3d 711,712-14 (7th Cir.
1997).
81 See Brungart v. Bellsouth Telecommunications, Inc., 231 F.3d 791, 798
(11 th Cir. 2000); Gleklen v. Democratic Cong. Campaign Comm., 199 F.3d 1365,
1368 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Smith v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 202 F.3d 234, 248 (4th
Cir. 2000); King v. Preferred Technical Group, 166 F.3d 887, 891 (7th Cir. 1999);
Chaffin v. John H. Carter Co., 179 F.3d 316, 320 (5th Cir. 1999); Morgan v. Hilti,
108 F.3d 1319, 1323 (10th Cir. 1997).
83 King, 166 F.3d at 887.
84 Chaffin, 179 F.3d at 316.
85 Morgan, 108 F.3d at 1319.
16 See King, 166 F.3d at 891-92; Chaffin, 179 F.3d at 320; Morgan, 108 F.3d
at 1325.
17 Glecklen, 199 F.3d at 1368.
1s Brungart, 231 F.3d at 794-95.
89 See Brungart, 231 F.3d at 794-95; Glecklen, 199 F.3d at 1368.
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retaliation had no other independent right to retain his job or escape
discipline, he or she had to prove that the employer acted with discrimina-
tory intent.
Some courts have relied only on a retaliation analysis in reviewing a
dismissed employee's claim, even though the employers have also failed to
reinstate their employees by dismissing them.9" For example, the Sixth
Circuit analyzed the dismissal of a employee just before the end of her
leave solely under the retaliatory discharge framework, requiring that the
employee show a causal connection between her leave and her dismissal.9
Similarly, in Santos v. Knitgoods Workers' Union, the court entertained a
motion to dismiss because the plaintiff failed to allege that she was
dismissed because she had taken leave; the motion was only denied because
the alleged facts, particularly the timing of the dismissal, showed a causal
relationship.92 This approach requires that the employee prove the em-
ployer's intent to retaliate, despite the employer's positive obligation to
reinstate.
Courts have also applied this burden to plaintiffs asserting a positive
right under the FMLA, such as reinstatement.93 Under this burden, an
employee must prove that the employer would have allowed his or her
retention absent the leave.94 This also would mean that the employee must
prove that the employer did not offer the returning employee the same or
equivalent job upon return from leave. 9
9o See, e.g., Wilson v. Lemington Home for the Aged, 159 F. Supp. 2d 186,
194-96 (W.D. Pa. 2001) (dismissal following failure to provide certificate that was
not requested properly analyzed as both positive claim and retaliation claim);
Leung v. SHK Mgmt., Inc., No. 98-3337, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19417, at *41-47
(E.D. Pa. Dec. 21, 1999) (claim of employee dismissed while on leave only
analyzed as retaliation claim).
"' Chandler v. Specialty Tires of America (Tenn.), Inc., 283 F.3d 818, 825-26
(6th Cir. 2002).
92 Santos v. Knitgoods Workers' Union, No. 99 Civ. 1499 (BSJ), 1999 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 9036, at *8-11 (S.D.N.Y. June 11, 1999), dismissed on other grounds,
252 F.3d 175 (2d Cir. 2001); see also Lacey-Manarel v. Mothers Work, Inc., No.
01 Civ. 0235 (JSR), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5541, at *4-6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29,
2002) (granting summary judgment to the defendants because the employee's
dismissal was based on legitimate business reasons; no causal relationship between
dismissal and FMLA leave).
93 Rice v. Sunrise Express, Inc., 209 F.3d 1008, 1018 (7th Cir. 2000); King,
166 F.3d at 891.
94 Rice, 209 F.3d at 1018; King, 166 F.3d at 891.
9' Watkins v. J & S Oil Co., 164 F.3d 55, 59 (1st Cir. 1998); see also Wilson
v. Tanf, Inc., No. CV-99-1412-HU, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13425, at *31 (D. Ore.
Sept. 8, 2000) (burden on plaintiff purchasing agent to show that offered position
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Under this allocation of the burden of proof, an employee still "bears
the ultimate burden of establishing the right to [reinstatement]." 96 Thus, if
an employer submits evidence that the employee would not have retained
his or her position if he or she had not taken FMILA leave, "the employee
must ultimately convince the trier of fact" that he or she would have
retained the position if leave had not been taken.97 An employee must prove
affirmatively that the employer would not have discharged him or her if he
or she had not taken the FMLA leave.
98
The effect of this allocation of burden is illustrated by the outcome in
Rice v. Sunrise Express, Inc., which granted the employer's motion for a
new trial after the original jury found a FMLA violation based on the lay
off and eventual dismissal of Rice just four days before she was scheduled
to return from her FMLA leave.99 The Rice court recognized that because
the "evidence was fairly close," the allocation of burden could have
affected the outcome at trial."' 0 Similarly, the Seventh Circuit upheld the
judgment for the employer in Kohis v. Beverly Enterprises Wisconsin, Inc.
because the employer presented evidence that Kohls had been discharged
for poor performance, and she could not meet her burden of showing that
she would not have been dismissed absent her taking of FMLA leave.'
Noting that a court should not tell an employer how to discipline its
employees, the Kohis court held that a showing of pretext does not
necessarily satisfy the employee's burden.102
Rather than placing such a great burden on a plaintiff, who would
otherwise be entitled to return to work after FMLA leave, courts should
adhere to the Department of Labor's placement of the burden on the
employer to justify the denial of reinstatement. Employers have the
knowledge of business justifications for refusing to reinstate an employee.
In contrast, placement of the burden on the employee places him or her in
the position of proving a negative. For example, the employee would have
was not equivalent).
96 Rice, 209 F.3d at 1018; see also Kohls v. Beverly Enters. Wis., Inc., 259
F.3d 799, 804 (7th Cir. 2001) (citing Rice, 209 F.3d at 1018).
97 Rice, 209 F.3d at 1018.
91 Kohls, 259 F.3d at 804-05. See also Snelling v. Clarian Health Partners, Inc.,
184 F. Supp. 2d 838, 846 (S.D. Ind. 2002) (citing Diaz v. Fort Wayne Foundry
Corp., 131 F.3d 711, 712 (7th Cir. 1997)); Kohls, 259 F.3d at 804.
99Rice, 209 F.3d at 1011.1 0 Id. at 1018.
Wo Kohls, 259 F.3d at 804-06.
o2Id. at 806.
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to prove that the employer would not have dismissed him or her absent the
FMLA leave, which is an untenable position.
III. THE ROLE OF INTENT
In addition to this initial allocation of the burden of proof, courts
should further protect an employee's right to reinstatement by rethinking
the role of intent in determining whether the employer can avoid its duty to
reinstate. Even if the court appropriately places the burden on the employer
to prove the legitimacy of its reason for failing to reinstate an employee
after FMLA leave, the employee should still be able to challenge the
legitimacy of that reason. Just as an employee alleging a violation of the
Equal Pay Act can show that the employer's reasons for the inequality of
pay are based on discriminatory intent," 3 an employee who has been denied
reinstatement should be able to show that an employer's reason is a pretext
for punishing that employee for taking FMLA leave.
Since the FMLA provides for reinstatement as an entitlement, courts
have generally agreed that an employee need not establish an employer's
discriminatory intent to receive relief when reinstatement has been denied
for any reason beyond the defenses provided in the statute. Section
2615(a)(1) contains no reference to the employer's intent, indicating that
intent is irrelevant to a claim under this section."4 The Kaylor v. Fannin
Regional Hospital, Inc. court was perhaps the first to recognize that the
FMLA created strict liability for denial of statutory rights. 5
Since the Kaylor decision, many courts have recognized that a plaintiff
asserting a positive right of reinstatement need not prove the employer's
discriminatory intent.l0 6 In the context of dismissing an employee for taking
103 Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1998). But see Garner v.
Motorola, Inc., 95 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1074 (D. Ariz. 2000), aff'd, 33 Fed. Appx.
880, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 7408 (9th Cir. Ariz. 2002) ("The intentions of the
employer are not a factor in determining liability under the Equal Pay Act.").
104 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1) (2003). See Cross v. Southwest Recreational Indus.,
Inc., 17 F. Supp. 2d 1362, 1368 (N.D. Ga. 1998).05 Kaylor v. Fannin Reg'l Hosp., Inc., 946 F. Supp. 988, 997 (N.D. Ga. 1996).
'06 See Ogbom v. United Food and Commercial Workers Union, 305 F.3d 763,
769 (7th Cir. 2002), rehg denied, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 22481 (7th Cir. Oct. 25,
2002) ("proof of pretext is neither necessary nor sufficient"); Mann v. Mass.
Correa Electric, No. 00 Civ. 3559, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 949, at *22 (S.D.N.Y.
Jan. 23, 2002) (denying defendant's motion for summary judgment because plain-
tiff "need only show that she was entitled to an FMLA benefit and denied that
entitlement by her employer"); Marrero v. Camden County Bd. of Soc. Servs., 164
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FMLA leave, the Ninth Circuit has stated that "there is no room for a
McDonnell Douglas type of pretext analysis when evaluating an 'interfer-
ence' claim under [the FMLA]."'' 7 Similarly, the Eighth Circuit has held
that the McDonnell Douglas analysis should not be used to determine
whether an employee had a right of reinstatement because she suffered
from a "serious health condition" under the FMiLA, since "claims under the
FMLA do not depend on discrimination." '
Even though an employee is not required to prove discriminatory intent
to establish an initial right of reinstatement, an employer's intent should be
considered in assessing whether the employee would not have continued his
or her employment if he or she had not taken FMLA leave. This determina-
tion necessarily requires an inquiry into the employer's intent in refusing
to reinstate. Courts have taken different positions on whether evidence of
pretext has any role in the analysis of a claim to enforce the positive right
of reinstatement. 109
Even though it upheld the summary judgment for the employer, the
Kohis court imagined situations where the timing of a decision to dismiss
an employee could support a factual inference that the employee would not
have been fired if he or she had not taken leave."0 For example, if a
supervisor uses past known performance problems to justify a dismissal
after leave has begun, then a fact finder may infer that the termination
occurred because the employee took leave. 1 ' This language in Kohls comes
F. Supp. 2d 455, 463 (D.N.J. 2001) (defendant cannot defend reliance on FMLA
absences in dismissing plaintiff based on "legitimate, nondiscriminatory" basis for
the dismissal).
107 Bachelder v. America West Airlines, Inc., 259 F.3d 1112, 1131 (9th Cir.
2001).
108 Rankin v. Seagate Techs., Inc., 246 F.3d 1145, 1148 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing
Diaz v. Fort Wayne Foundry Corp., 131 F.3d 711, 712 (7th Cir. 1997)), reh'g
denied, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 12885 (8th Cir. June 1, 2001).
9 See Ogborn v. United Food and Commercial Workers Union, 305 F.3d 763,
769 (7th Cir. 2002) (stating that "in a suit charging violations of the substantive,
as opposed to the anti-discrimination, provisions of the FMLA, proof of pretext is
neither necessary nor sufficient to show a violation of the statute") (citing Kohls
v. Beverly Enters. Wis., Inc., 259 F.3d 799, 806 (7th Cir. 2001); Diaz, 131 F.3d at
713; Bachelder, 259 F.3d at 1131). Cf Chaffin v. John H. Carter Co., 179 F.3d 316
(5th Cir. 1999) (requiring plaintiff to prove pretext in order to overcome summary
judgment for the employer); Morgan v. Hilti, Inc., 108 F.3d 1319 (10th Cir. 1997)
(affirming summary judgment for the employer because the employee "did not raise
any material issues of fact as the [employer's] motivation" for dismissing her).
"oKohls, 259 F.3d at 806.
1| Id.
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close to allowing an employee to challenge the justification offered by an
employer for failing to reinstate the employee if the employer's reasons
lack credence.
Yet the Seventh Circuit has relied on its decisions in Kohls and Diaz to
conclude that "proof of pretext is neither necessary nor sufficient to show
a violation of the statute."' 12 Such evidence of an employer's discriminatory
intent "does nothing to negate" the evidence offered by an employer of
reasons why the employee should not remain in its employ, according to
Ogborn v. United Food and Commercial Workers Union."3 The Ogborn
court upheld a summary judgment for the employer based on the plaintiff's
performance deficiencies, even though some of the information regarding
his performance was not fully disclosed to the employer until after he began
his leave." 4 He was then dismissed during his leave." 5 The court only
considered whether the evidence showed that the employer would have
dismissed Ogbom even if he had not taken his FMLA leave.16
Some courts have come closer to examining the employer's intent when
reviewing a jury verdict finding a violation based on an employer's refusal
to reinstate. As the Tenth Circuit explained in Smith v. Diffee Ford-
Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., regardless of whether the failure to reinstate was
retaliatory, an employee can prevail under his or her statutory entitlement
to reinstatement if he or she was denied that right "for a reasorl connected
with her FMLA leave."' 7 Under this reasoning, Smith presented sufficient
evidence that she was entitled to reinstatement based on her "long years of
service," the employer's failure to seriously discipline her prior to her
leave, and "the lack of formal emphasis" on training a replacement before
her FMLA leave."' The Smith court upheld the jury verdict in favor of
Smith because she presented evidence from which a reasonable jury could
have found that she would have been employed if she had not taken FMLA
leave." 9
Other courts have similarly entertained evidence on the invalidity of the
employer's reasons for failing to reinstate the employee. The court in
Snelling v. Clarian Health Partners, Inc. refused to grant the employer's
112 Ogborn, 305 F.3d at 769 (emphasis added).
113 Id.
114 Id. at 765-69.
"' Id. at 766-67.
116 Id. at 768-69.
"' Smith v. Diffee Ford-Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 298 F.3d 955, 961 (10th Cir.
2002).
118Id.
"9Id. at 962.
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motion for summary judgment in part because a reasonable juror could find
that the employer's reasons for refusing to reinstate the employee were
pretextual. 20 The court refused to rely on the employer's evidence that the
employee "failed to provide appropriate customer service and support,...
fail[ed] to meet performance goals, . . . and made misrepresentations
regarding work accomplished."' In allowing an employee to argue that the
employer's reason for refusing reinstatement was pretextual, the court's
analysis for the right to reinstatement claim referred directly to its finding
of evidence of pretext in relation to the retaliation claim.'22
Some courts that place the burden on employers to justify the failure
to reinstate employees have given those employees a limited opportunity
to challenge the legitimacy of their employers' reasons for refusing to
reinstate. Timing, a traditional factor in pretext analysis, has sometimes
been considered in determining whether an employee should have been
reinstated from leave. The Smith court upheld a verdict in Smith's favor,
relying on the timing of Smith's dismissal only thirteen days before her
date of return.'23 The court followed that reasoning in Anderson v. Coors
Brewing Co., in which the court held that a one and a half month time
period between the leave and the employee's dismissal could establish
causation.'24 In Anderson, the burden was placed on the employer to show
that the aide would not otherwise be employed at the time she requested
reinstatement from her FMLA leave.'25 The Anderson court had refused to
grant the hospital's motion for summary judgment where the theft
allegations only arose after Anderson had filed suit, and the hospital
originally asserted that she was dismissed at the end of her twelve weeks
of leave. 116
Similarly, where an employee's position was eliminated within a month
of requesting leave, the court in Merli v. Bill Communications, Inc. inferred
that the decision was based on the use of that leave, despite the employer's
contention that the position was eliminated as part of a staff reorgan-
ization. 27 Yet this same court concluded that an employee has no claim for
'20 Snelling v. Clarian Health Partners, Inc., 184 F. Supp. 2d 838, 848-49 (S.D.
Ind. 2002).
I2' d. at 848.
'Id. at 849.
113 Smith, 298 F.3d at 961.
'24 Id. (quoting Anderson v. Coors Brewing Co., 181 F.3d 1171, 1179 (10th
Cir. 1999)).
125 Anderson, 181 F.3d at 1179.
126 Id.
127 Merli v. Bill Communications, Inc., No. 01 CIV 0359 (LMM), 2002 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 4530, at *7, 19 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2002).
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denial of FMLA benefits where the request for FMLA leave was denied,
even though the requestor's position was soon eliminated. 2 '
Timing has also been used to disprove an employer's intent to take an
action based on the employee's use of FMLA leave. The court inAhmarani
v. Sieling & Jones, Inc. relied heavily on the timing of the employer's
decision to dismiss the plaintiff before the plaintiff requested leave, while
recognizing that one can "imagine circumstances in which the timing of
[the decision to fire an employee] could lead a fact finder to infer that the
employee would not have been fired absent her taking of leave."' 29 Thus,
timing that suggests an intent to punish an employee for taking FMLA
leave may be one way to establish the illegitimacy of an employer's reasons
for refusing to reinstate an employee.
In addition to relying on suspicious timing, an employee may be able
to undermine the employer's justification for failing to reinstate him or her
by showing that the employer has not held other employees to the same
standard. The court in Morgan v. FBL Financial Services, Inc. considered
the employer's failure to adhere to its own job posting requirements before
hiring another employee when it refused to grant the employer's motion for
summary judgment on the plaintiff's claim that her dismissal interfered
with her positive rights under the FMLA. 30
In considering the employer's treatment of similarly situated employ-
ees, the court in Gerking v. Wabash Ford/Sterling Truck Sales, Inc.
compared the burden on an employer who has refused to reinstate to the
burden on an employer who must overcome direct evidence of discrimina-
tion in a "mixed-motive" discrimination claim.' Gerking's employer
claimed that he was not reinstated based on allegations of sexual harass-
ment made against him, but the employer had tolerated similar conduct by
other employees in the past and had never implemented a sexual harass-
ment policy.'32 Because Gerking raised issues of fact as to the legitimacy
2' Id. at *21-22.
129 Ahmarani v. Sieling & Jones, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 2d 658, 659-61 (D. Md.
2002) (alterations in original) (quoting Kohls v. Beverly Enters. Wis., Inc., 259
F.3d 799, 806 (7th Cir. 2001)); see also Snelling v. Clarian Health Partners, Inc.,
184 F. Supp. 2d 838, 854 (S.D. Ind. 2002) (timing used to find pretext to support
both retaliation and failure to reinstate claims).
130 Morgan v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 178 F. Supp. 2d 1022, 1031, 1034 (S.D.
Iowa 2001). The court noted that it would reach the same result under either the
preponderance of evidence standard or under a McDonnell Douglas type of
analysis. Id. at 1034.
13' Gerking v. Wabash Ford/Sterling Truck Sales, Inc., No. IP IPOO-0495-C
B/K, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17365, at *32 n.6 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 6, 2002).
132Id. at *32-34.
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of the employer's reasons for not reinstating him, his employer was not
granted summary judgment.133 This approach appropriately differs from the
typical "honest belief" defense under which an employer can defend a
claim of disparate treatment by asserting that it had no discriminatory intent
because the employer honestly believed in the legitimacy of its reasons for
taking an adverse action.
1 34
Even if an employer honestly believes that it has a legitimate reason for
not reinstating an employee, the employer must still establish that the
employee would have been dismissed if he or she had not taken leave. In
a typical disparate treatment claim, an employer can escape liability if it
honestly believed in the legitimacy of its reasons for taking an adverse
action against an employee, since such a belief undermines a finding of
discriminatory intent. 
3
In determining whether an employer interfered with an employee's
right to use FMLA leave, the Ninth Circuit has declined to excuse an
employer's refusal to reinstate an employee after FMLA leave based on the
employer's honest belief in the legitimacy of its actions. 36 The court in
Bachelder v. American West Airlines, Inc. reversed a summary judgment
for an employer that had failed.to reinstate an employee who the employer
believed had exhausted all of her FMLA leave. 37 The employer's failure
to reinstate was not excused by its good faith, particularly where the
employer has the responsibility to determine whether an employee's leave
is protected by the FMLA.
Under this approach, an employer could not dismiss an employee based
on its unfounded belief that the employee's absences were not protected by
the FMLA. 39 An "honest belief' defense would undermine the employer's
133 Id. at *34. Note that the court reached the same conclusion on Gerking's
FMLA interference claim, although it presented " a closer call." Id. at *34-39.
'34 See, e.g., Pugh v. City of Attica, Ind., 259 F.3d 619, 626-27 (7th Cir. 2001)
(employee failed to show that investigation of misappropriated funds reached
wrong conclusion); Smith v. Chrysler Corp., 155 F.3d 799,806 (6th Cir. 1998 ) (no
pretext if employer can show that it honestly believed in reasons for action);
Kariotis v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 131 F.3d 672, 677 (7th Cir. 1997)
(employer only needed to show that it honestly believed that employee was
dishonest in extending leave).
131 See, e.g., Smith, 155 F.3d at 806 (employer need only make a reasonably
informed and considered decision); Kariotis, 131 F.3d at 675-77 (question is not
whether the employer's reasons are right but whether they are honest).
136 Bachelder v. America West Airlines, Inc., 259 F.3d 1112, 1130 (9th Cir.
2001).
1
37 Id.
138 Id. at 1130-31.
'3 1 Id. at 1130.
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obligation to determine whether leave is covered by the FMLA 4 ° Thus, an
employee need not prove that the employer's reasons are pretextual to
survive a motion for summary judgment, particularly where the employer
admits that use of leave was considered- in dismissing the employee and had
previously characterized the performance problems relied upon as
"minor.'' Such an employer may not be liable for liquidated damages, but
it would be liable for actual damages resulting from such a dismissal.
1 42
IV. WHY AND How INTENT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED
The role of intent in determining the scope of the right to reinstatement
under the FMLA can be compared to the right to receive equal pay under
the Fair Labor Standards Act's equal pay provisions. Looking to the Equal
Pay Act ("EPA") is appropriate since both the EPA and the FMLA provide
a positive right to employees that employers can only avoid based on some
legitimate reason.1 43 Unlike courts interpreting the FMLA's right to
reinstatement, however, courts interpreting the EPA have not required an
employee to carry the burden of proving the illegitimacy of an employer's
reasons for failing to pay equal pay without considering evidence of the
employer's discriminatory intent.144
Courts interpreting the Equal Pay Act have consistently required
employers to justify payment of unequal wages, and employees can
challenge such justifications with evidence of an employer's discriminatory
intent' 45 The EPA provides that no employer:
shall discriminate... between employees on the basis of sex by paying
wages to employees in such establishment at a rate less than the rate at
which he pays wages to employees of the opposite sex in such establish-
ment for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal
14Oid.
1
41 Id. at 1131 n.22.
1421d. at 1130.
143 Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1999); The Family and Medical
Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (1999).
144 See, e.g., Gorence v. Eagle Food Ctrs., Inc., 242 F.3d 759, 762 (7th Cir.
2001) (citing the EPA stating that "a plaintiff must show either by an
acknowledgment of discriminatory intent by the defendant or circumstantial
evidence that provides the basis for an inference of intentional discrimination"
(citing Troupe v. May Dep't Stores, 20 F.3d 734, 736 (7th Cir. 1994))).
141 See, e.g., Brinkley-Obu v. Hughes Training, Inc., 36 F.3d 336, 353 (4th Cir.
1994) (allowing plaintiff to present evidence that defendant's justification for
higher wages for males could not be substantiated).
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skill, effort and responsibility, and which are performed under similar
working conditions...146
unless the differential is justified by one of four statutory exceptions, i.e.,
some nondiscriminatory pay system.147 The Secretary of Labor has the
burden of showing that the employer pays different wages to employees of
opposite sexes for the same work.14 As with the right to reinstatement
under the FMLA, under the Equal Pay Act, a plaintiff need not prove that
the employer intended to discriminate against her. 1
49
Under the EPA, upon a showing of a pay differential, the burden shifts
to the employer to show that the differential is justified by one of the four
statutory exceptions.' 50 In an EPA claim that reached the Supreme Court,
Coming Glass Works failed to carry this burden where the pay differential
arose because of the "generally higher wage level of male workers and the
need to compensate them for performing what were regarded as demeaning
tasks."'' The pay difference reflected the job market that allowed Coming
to pay women lower wages and that "men would not work at the low rates
paid to women."'52
To carry its burden ofjustifying a proven pay differential, the employer
must establish that the differential was based on a "factor other than
sex" and that the gender neutral factor was adopted for a legitimate
business reason.'53 This burden is a heavy one-the employer typically
146 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1998).
147 Id.
148 Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195 (1974).
"4 Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1310 (2d Cir. 1995); Brinkley-Obu,
36 F.3d at 344 n.17; Miranda v. B & B Cash Grocery Store, Inc., 975 F.2d 1518,
1526 (1 lth Cir. 1992).
150 Corning Glass Works, 417 U.S. at 196; see also Buntin v. Breathitt County
Bd. of Educ., 134 F.3d 796, 799 (6th Cir. 1998) (burden on employer in Equal Pay
Act claim); Meeks v. Computer Assocs. Int'l, 15 F.3d 1013, 1018 (11 th Cir. 1994)
(risk of nonpersuasion borne by the employer); Dole v. Alamo Found., 915 F.2d
349, 352 (8th Cir. 1990) (burden on employer to prove exception to Fair Labor
Standards Act requirements); Sutton v. Engineered Sys., Inc., 598 F.2d 1134, 1136
n.3 (8th Cir. 1979) (burden on employer to prove applicability of overtime
exemptions under Fair Labor Standards Act).
'I' Corning Glass Works, 417 U.S. at 204-05 (quoting Hodgson v. Coming
Glass Works, 474 F.2d 226, 233 (2d Cir. 1973)).
'52 Id. at 205.
13 Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1310 (quoting Aldrich v. Randolph Cent. Sch. Dist., 963
F.2d 520, 526-27, 526 and n.1 (2d Cir. 1992) (citing Kouba v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
691 F.2d 873, 876 (9th Cir. 1982))).
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must establish "that the factor of sex provided no basis for the wage
differential."'54 For example, a mere assertion that a male employee's
higher salary is based on his experience may be insufficient to meet this
burden, even without any evidence of discriminatory animus on the
employer's part.'55
To succeed on a motion for summary judgment, the employer "must
demonstrate that there is no genuine issue as to whether the difference in
pay is due to a factor other than sex.156 At trial, the burden is again on the
employer to establish that the difference in pay is due to factors other than
sex.157 For example, a jury verdict in favor of an underpaid female teacher
was upheld based on evidence that the merit system that the employer
relied upon to justify the pay differential was not neutral, but instead "was
driven largely by an opaque, decision-making process at the administra-
tive level" without reliance on peer assessment or department chair
recommendations. 5 This allocation of burden under the EPA protects
an employee's right to receive equal pay where the employer cannot justify
pay inequities.
Even if the employer meets its burden under the Equal Pay Act, the
plaintiff still has the opportunity to show with affirmative evidence that the
reason given for the pay differential is pretextual or is offered as a post-
event justification for the gender-based differential.'59 For example, one
employee was allowed to rebut the employer's justification for the pay
differential by alleging that the value placed by the employer on work
experience was inconsistent. 60 The Sixth Circuit has clarified that this
opportunity does not mean that the plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion
on the affirmative defense-the plaintiff simply has the burden of
producing evidence of pretext if the employer comes forward with evidence
' Mulhall v. Advance Sec., Inc., 19 F.3d 586, 590 (1 th Cir. 1994) (emphasis
in original). See also Irby v. Bittick, 44 F3d 949, 954 (11 th Cir. 1995).
151 Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1312-13.
'56 Brune v. BASF Corp., 41 F. Supp. 2d 768 (S.D. Ohio 1999), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part without op., 234 F.3d 1267, No. 99-3194, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS
26772, at *14 (6th Cir. Oct. 17, 2000).
' "Kovacevich v. Kent State Univ., 224 F.3d 806, 826 (6th Cir. 2000) (plaintiff
introduced sufficient evidence for jury to find that her lower salary was the result
of her sex).
"I Id. at 827-28.
151 Irby, 44 F.3d at 954; see also Brock v. Ga. Southwestern Coll., 765 F.2d
1026, 1036 (1 1th Cir. 1985) (holding that neither the college's "merit system" nor
"supply and demand" are sufficient to overcome the gender-based differential).
'60 Irby, 44 F.3d at 956.
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to prove that an affirmative defense applies.' 61 Thus, an employee can reach
a jury on an equal pay question even if the employer offers a justification
for the pay differential, if a reasonable jury could find that the employer's
policy is pretextual for paying differently based on sex.'
62
Giving employees an opportunity to show pretext does not mean that
employees will always prevail: A plaintiff may not be able to show pretext
based on justifiable differences in pay, even if the employer made some
statements that might be seen as sex-related, if no rational jury could find
that those statements meant that the plaintiff's pay differential was based
on her sex. 163 The Schwartz court explained that an employer can rely on
subjective reasons for pay differential, "[s]o long as subjective business
justifications, not part of a merit system, are not overly subjective so as to
render them incapable of being rebutted."'"
These Equal Pay Act cases illustrate how a court could give an
employee seeking reinstatement the opportunity to establish that the
employer's reasons. for refusing to reinstate are pretextual and that the
employee should still be reinstated. This approach should be applied when
a court determines whether an employer can escape its duty to reinstate
after an employee takes leave under FMLA. Consideration of the em-
ployer's intent is appropriate when the employer justifies its refusal to
reinstate based on performance or other reasons unrelated to the em-
ployee's use of leave, the employee's inability to perform job duties, and
the employer's failure to return an employee to the same or equivalent
work.
V. REASONS UNRELATED TO USE OF LEAVE
An employer may try to avoid its obligations to reinstate an employee
after that employee has taken FMLA leave for reasons apparently unrelated
to the employee's use of leave. If, for example, the employee had work
deficiencies prior to her leave that were documented by her employer, then
the employer may not need to reinstate that poorly performing employee. 1
65
161 Kahn v. Dean & Fulkerson, P.C., 238 F.3d 421, reported in full at No. 99-
1015, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 29386, at *20 (6th Cir. Nov. 13, 2000), cert. denied,
533 U.S. 916 (2001); Buntin v. Breathitt County Bd. of Educ., 134 F.3d 796, 800
n.7 (6th Cir. 1998).
162 Buntin, 134 F.3d at 800.
163 Kahn, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 29386, at *26-27.
'6 Schwartz v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 954 F.2d 620, 623 (11 th Cir. 1991).
161 See Clay v. City of Chicago Dep't of Health, 143 F.3d 1092, 1094 (7th Cir.
1998).
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To illustrate, the employer in Kohis adequately justified its dismissal of the
plaintiffs claim due to the fact that the employee had mishandled and
mismanaged funds before she went on leave.'66 Because the employee was
aware of the ways the funds had been handled at the time, the decision to
deny reinstatement was considered legitimate, even though the employer
may not have communicated its concerns directly with the employee prior
to her leave.'67
Dismissal can be justified even if the employer did not know of the
justification at the time the employee began his or her leave. In Kohis, for
example, some performance deficiencies were only discovered after the
leave began, and the court denied the employee's claim that the employer
had no justification for refusing reinstatement at the time the employee
began her leave.16 The Kohis court rationalized its decision by referring to
the judiciary's general reluctance to tell employers how to discipline their
employees or how to deal with employees more fairly or effectively. 69
Similarly, the court in Ogborn v. United Food & Commerical Workers
Union upheld the employer-union's refusal to reinstate a union business
agent who had failed to process grievances adequately prior to his leave,
even though these inadequacies were only discovered after the leave
began.
170
Because these employers were able to show that the reasons for
refusing to reinstate were not discovered prior to the employees beginning
their leave, the courts would not infer any ill intent on the employers' part.
Yet these courts did not give the employees returning from FMLA leave an
opportunity to convince a trier of fact that the employers' reasons for
refusing to reinstate them were not legitimate. Dismissal of such claims
enables employers to articulate reasons for refusing to reinstate an
employee only after an employee has begun FMLA leave. Such an
opportunity allows an employer to justify a refusal to reinstate even if its
decision to deny reinstatement truly stems from the employee's use of
FMLA leave.
Performance problems may sometimes justify an employer's failure to
reinstate even if the employer was aware of these problems prior to the
employee's use of leave. For example, the court in Carpenter v. Northwest
1' Kohls v. Beverly Enters. Wis., Inc., 259 F.3d 799, 805 (7th Cir. 2001).
16 7 
id.
1
68 Id. at 805-06.
169 1d.
70 Ogbom v. United Food & Commerical Workers Union, 305 F.3d 763, 768
(7th Cir. 2002).
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Airlines, Inc. upheld the removal of a supervisor from her position one day
after returning from leave based on her poor job performance prior to
taking the leave, even though some of those problems had been recognized
by the employer more than two months prior to the start of her leave. 7'
This post-leave justification for an employer's refusal to reinstate opens the
door for an employer decision based not on legitimate concerns about the
employee's performance, but based on the employer's displeasure over that
employee's use of FMLA leave.
Sometimes an employer's reasons for dismissing an employee have
been deemed unworthy of credence, even if related to the employee's
performance. 72 These courts come closer to allowing the employee an
opportunity to show that the employer's refusal to reinstate is based on
pretextual reasons. For example, the employer in Nero v. Industrial
Molding Corp. refused to reinstate an employee based on its position that
it dismissed him prior to the leave because he had not performed well. 73
Because of the suspicious nature of the documents relied upon by the
employer to show that the termination had preceded the leave, the jury
verdict in Nero's favor was upheld by the appellate court.174 Such an
approach helps to prevent an employer from relying on reasons that could
have been created to cover up an adverse action based on an employee's
use of FMLA leave.
Rather than refusing to reinstate based on an employee's past perfor-
mance, an employer may also attempt to avoid the statutory reinstatement
obligation by eliminating the employee's position before he or she even
begins the FMLA leave. For example, a lead pump service technician who
requested leave to undergo surgery was discharged when his employer
decided to eliminate his position shortly after that request but before he
started his leave. 75 He was not entitled to reinstatement since he had not
begun his leave and did not have an independent right to request a transfer
to another position prior to requesting leave.'76 Similarly, a staff attorney
'7' Carpenter v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 20323 (8th
Cir. Sept. 23, 2002), aff'g 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2146 (D. Minn. Feb. 5, 2002).
'72 Blankenship v. Buchanan Gen. Hosp., Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 668,675 (W.D.
Va. 2001) (theft allegation unworthy of credence where employee only learned of
allegation during discovery in FMLA claim).
"' Nero v. Indus. Molding Corp., 167 F.3d 921, 926 (5th Cir. 1999).
174 Id. at 926, 928.
"' Skrjanc v. Great Lakes Power Serv. Co., 272 F.3d 309, 312-15 (6th Cir.
2001).
176Id. at 316.
[VOL. 91
FAMILY MEDICAL LEAVE ACT
whose position was eliminated after she had requested but had not yet taken
leave could not demand reinstatement by her employer. 77 Neither of these
courts fully considered whether the employer acted based on a discrimina-
tory intent because the decision to eliminate the employees' positions was
influenced by the employees' requests for leave.
The court in Sauer v. McGraw-Hill Cos. engaged in a deeper analysis
of whether the plaintiff had a claim for failure to reinstate when the
employer decided to eliminate her position while she was on leave. 78 The
court found that the position was legitimately eliminated since the
performance of her duties no longer constituted a single, distinct position,
even though her duties were distributed among other employees.'79 To
determine whether the position would have been eliminated if Sauer had
not taken leave, the court determined that the reorganization did in fact
occur in conjunction with reallocation of functions to another business
unit."' The court also found that the decision to reorganize was a legitimate
one since several other employees were affected by it. 8' The Sauer court
relied on the same findings to conclude that the employer did not have an
intent to retaliate against Sauer for her use of FMLA leave." 2
The elimination or change in duties of a position while an employee is
on FULA leave can be challenged as an illegitimate reason for refusing to
restore an employee to his position after that leave, if the court is willing
to examine the validity of that reason. The Voorhees court, for example,
refused to grant summary judgment to Time Warner, which claimed that it
had reassigned the plaintiffs supervisory duties because of complaints
from employees she supervised prior to her leave.'83 Several of those same
employees offered affidavits that they had not made such complaints, thus
undermining the employer's reasons for refusing to reinstate Voorhees in
the same position.'84
Similarly, the Cross court refused to find as a matter of law that the
plaintiff's position had been eliminated where she had been told that the
1' Ilhardt v. Sara Lee Corp., 118 F.3d 1151, 1152, 1157 (7th Cir. 1997).
78 Sauer v. McGraw-Hill Cos., No. 99-N1898,2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15936,
at *52-53 (D. Colo. June 12, 2001).
'79 Id. at *54.
'"0 Id. at *53.
181 Id.
'82 Id. at *54-58.
183 Voorhees v. Time Warner Cable Nat'l Div., No. 98-1460, 1999 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 13227, at *14-16 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 26, 1999).
184 1d. at *15.
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position was intended to be permanent and the process that she was
implementing was not complete.185 The employer's justification for failing
to restore the employee did not absolve it from its responsibility to
reinstate, even though the employer argued that the position was temporary
and that the plaintiff had completed all the required tasks that fell under
that position.1
8 6
The Brenlia court engaged in a similar review of the employer's
justification for refusing to reinstate a comptroller for a car dealership
based on its decision to eliminate her position.187 The dealership had given
the plaintiff's duties to another employee while she was on leave and then
hired another 'clerical worker to perform similar duties.'88 The court
specifically looked at whether the consolidation of positions was "moti-
vated by legitimate business concerns."' 89 The motivation was found to be
questionable when the dealership claimed that it wanted to save the
plaintiffs salary but soon hired another employee. Further, the decision
was allegedly made in a fifteen minute meeting on the day the plaintiff was
to return to work and the dealership failed to objectively assess who was
best qualified for the new consolidated position.Y9 Based on the dealer-
ship's questionable motive, the court concluded that the plaintiff's use of
leave was the "sole determining factor" in eliminating her position and
refusing to reinstate her in the newly created position."'
These cases illustrate how a court could provide an employee with the
opportunity to challenge the reasons for the employer's refusal to reinstate
him or her, even if those reasons are not directly related to his or her taking
of FMLA leave. Yet many courts will grant a motion for summary
judgment in favor of an employer who has eliminated or changed an
employee's position while he or she was on FMLA leave without closely
examining the employer's justification for doing so.'92 Instead, courts
185 Cross v. Southwest Recreational Indus., Inc., 17 F. Supp. 2d 1362, 1370-71
(N.D. Ga. 1998).
186Id. at 1370.
'87 Brenlla v. LaSorsa Buick Pontiac Chevrolet, Inc., No. 00 Civ. 5207 (JCF),
2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9358, at *10-18 (S.D.N.Y. May 28, 2002).
1881Id. at *13.
189 Id.
19°1d. at* 13-16.
'9' Id. at * 17. Note that the court upheld the plaintiff's retaliation claim for
many of these same reasons. Id. at * 19-25.
192 See, e.g., Ilhardt v. Sara Lee Corp., 118 F.3d 1151 (7th Cir. 1997); Brenlla
v. LaSorsa Buick Pontiac Chevrolet, Inc., No. 00-Civ-5207, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
9358 (S.D.N.Y. May 28, 2002); and Sauer v. McGraw-Hill Cos., Inc., No. 99-N-
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should allow such a claim to go to a jury to determine whether the
employer's reasons for refusing to reinstate are legitimate and unrelated to
an employee's use of FMLA leave.
VI. INABILITY TO PERFORM THE JOB
An employee's medical condition that justified his or her use of FMLA
leave may hinder his or her right to return to work after that leave. Since an
employer must only provide reinstatement if that employee would have
been entitled to the position if the leave was not taken, 93 an employer can
refuse to reinstate an employee returning from FMLA leave if that
employee cannot perform the essential duties of the position.'94 For
example, if an employee's disability prevents him or her from performing
the duties of business manager, his or her employer need not reinstate him
or her in that position following FMLA leave.'95 Similarly, a shipping
attendant was not entitled to reinstatement because he could no longer lift
heavy objects, stand for long periods of time, or work a ten hour day-all
requirements of his former position. 196
Employees who suffer a short term medical impairment that inhibits
their ability to work for longer than twelve weeks may find themselves
unprotected under either the FMLA or the Americans with Disabilities Act
("ADA"). '97 Typically, the ADA will not provide any protection to a person
who suffers only a temporary impairment because he or she is not "dis-
abled" under the ADA's definition.'98
1898, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15937 (D. Colo. June 11, 2001).
" 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(3)(B) (2000).
194 29 C.F.R. § 825.214(b) (2003).
'95 Hatchett v. Philander Smith Coll., 251 F.3d 670, 675-76 (8th Cir. 2001); see
also Alifano v. Merck & Co., 175 F. Supp. 2d 792, 795 (E.D. Pa. 2001)
(termination upheld because employee unable to return to work at end of twelve
weeks of leave).
196 Reynolds v. Phillips & Temro Indus., Inc., 195 F.3d 411, 414 (8th Cir.
1999).
197 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat.
327 (3d Cir. 2002) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
'9" Under the ADA, "[t]he term disability means, with respect to an individual
-(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the
major lifeactivities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C)
being regarded as having such an impairment." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2003); see
Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002); see also Halperin
v. Abacus Tech. Corp., 128 F.3d 191, 199-200 (4th Cir. 1997) (employee who
suffered back injury did not suffer permanent or long term impairment so as to be
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At the same time, if the employee cannot return to work within twelve
weeks, he or she has no right of reinstatement under the FMvLA.' 99 If an
employee receives the twelve weeks of FILA leave and remains unable to
perform the duties of his or her position, that employer does not violate the
FMLA by dismissing that employee and filling his or her position.200
The expiration of an employee's twelve weeks of leave can legitimate
the loss of reinstatement rights. However, an employee may not always be
aware of when the twelve week period begins. For example, if an employee
uses sick and/or personal time to cover part of the leave, the employee may
not be aware that the employer is counting such time as part of the
employee's twelve weeks of FMLA leave. Yet under the Supreme Court's
decision in Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., absent a showing of
consequential harm, the employee would have no right of return even if the
employer failed to inform the employee that her leave was being counted
toward FMLA's twelve week limit.20" The Ragsdale Court refused to
follow the Department of Labor's regulations that would extend an
employee's leave based on the period of time during which he or she was
not informed that the employer was counting the time off as FMLA
leave.2
02
The combination of Ragsdale and the lack of a duty to reinstate based
on the expiration of leave provides employers with an additional opportu-
nity to avoid reinstating employees by intentionally withholding informa-
tion from them. This potential for abuse is illustrated by the claim of an
employee who was dismissed while on leave when her employer had failed
to designate the leave as FMLA leave, and therefore, she believed that she
still had more leave available.2 3 As the Nusbaum court observed,
disabled under ADA); Cornier v. Littlefield, 112 F. Supp. 2d 196, 199 (D. Mass.
2000) (temporary knee injury "did not substantially limit [employee's] life
activities and is thus not a 'disability' ").
'99See, e.g., Katekovich v. Team Rent a Car, Inc., 36 Fed. Appx. 688, 691 (3d
Cir. 2002) (employee unable to show that she could have returned within twelve
week leave period); Holmes v. e.spire Communications, 135 F. Supp. 2d 657, 666
(D. Md. 2001) (employee unable to return to work at end of twelve weeks of
maternity leave); Soletro v. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus., 130 F. Supp. 2d 906, 911
(N.D. Ohio 2001) (employee unable to return at end of leave).
2o Samo v. Douglas Elliman-Gibbons & Ives, Inc., 183 F.3d 155, 161-62 (2d
Cir. 1999).
20 Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81, 122 S. Ct. 1155,
1161-63 (2002).2 2 d. at 1163.
203 Nusbaum v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 377, 380-81 (D.N.J.
2001).
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[t]he overall intent of the FMLA is lost when an employer fails to provide
an employee with the opportunity to make informed decisions about her
leave options and limitations. Without such an opportunity, the employee
has not received the statutory benefit of taking necessary leave with the
reassurance that her employment under proscribed conditions, will be
waiting for her when she is able to return to work.204
Thus, an employer can fail to inform an employee until after the end of her
twelve weeks of leave that it is being counted toward the FMLA limit and
still refuse to reinstate him or her if he or she has not returned to work at
the end of that twelve weeks.
The Supreme Court's decision in Ragsdale makes it essential that an
employee be allowed to bring in evidence of an employer's discriminatory
intent when challenging a refusal to reinstate after FMLA leave. Otherwise,
an employer with intent to discriminate against an employee for taking
FMLA leave can wait until the end of the employee's leave before
informing him that he has used all of his FMLA leave and then dismiss that
employee for even a disingenuous reason.
Since an employee must be able to perform his or her job duties to
exercise the right of reinstatement, an employee's right to be reinstated
when lacking an ability to perform those essential duties rests solely under
the provisions of the ADA.20 ' The Sixth Circuit made it clear that the
FMLA claim of Williams was properly dismissed in Williams v. Toyota
Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. because Williams could not show
that she was able to work at the end of her leave or would eventually be
able to return to work.206 Notably, Williams convinced the Sixth Circuit
that she was eligible for protection under the ADA, although the Supreme
Court subsequently held that she was not disabled under the ADA.2"7
Unlike the ADA, the FMILA does not expressly require that an
employer offer any accommodation to an employee returning from FMLA
leave.208 Because the employer is not required to accommodate, some
2o4 Id. at 386.
205 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat.
327 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
206 Williams v. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc., 224 F.3d 840, 845 (6th Cir.
2000), rev'd on other grounds, 534 U.S. 184, 122 S.Ct. 681 (2002); see also
Cormier v. Littlefield, 112 F. Supp. 2d 196, 199 (D. Mass. 2000) (employee not
ready to return to work after knee injury within twelve weeks).
207 Williams, 224 F.3d at 843-45.
208 See Green v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 182 F. Supp. 2d 128, 138
(D. Me. 2002) (employer has no duty under FMLA to allow plaintiff to reduce
work time to four hours per day due to medical condition); Alifano v. Merck &
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courts have consistently'held that an employee who cannot perform the
duties of his position held prior to the leave has no right of reinstate-
ment.
209
Some courts have taken a less drastic view of the need for an employee
to be able to perform previous job duties. Rather than using the criteria
employed under the ADA, the Eighth Circuit has looked at whether the
employee returning from leave can perform the essential functions of his
or her job in his or her "current environment. '210 The Duty court later
explained that this approach was appropriate to advance the FMLA's goal
of maintaining job security.211 Thus, it affirmed the jury's order to restore
Duty to his former position even though he was limited in his ability to lift,
which was sometimes required by his job.2 2 The opinion suggests that
Duty's right to return to work under the FMLA was more compelling than
his rights under the ADA, even though his ADA claim was based in part on
his request for a transfer to another position and the failure of his employer
to entertain other requests for accommodation.213
Like the physical inability to perform essential job duties, time spent
on the job can be considered an essential job duty for the purpose of
excusing an employer from its obligation to reinstate an employee. In
Tardie v. Rehabilitation Hospital, for example, the court held that the
position of human resources director at a hospital was expected to work
more than forty hours per week.214 Because Tardie could not work more
than forty hours per week, she was not entitled to reinstatement to that
position.21 Even if the FMLA required some accommodation by employ-
ers, such accommodation would not require a reduction of the hours that an
employee must work or an indefinite period of leave if working regular
Co., 175 F. Supp. 2d 792, 795 (E. D. Pa. 2001) (FMLA carried no obligation to
accommodate serious health condition); Jewell v. Reid's Confectionary Co., 172
F. Supp. 2d 212, 220 (D. Me. 2001) (employer had no obligation to accommodate
loss of driver's license for health reasons).
209 See, e.g., Rinehimer v. Cemcolift, Inc., 292 F.3d 375, 384 (3d Cir. 2002)
(reinstatement properly denied to employee who could not perform the essential
functions of his position).
210 Stekloff v. St. John's Mercy Health Sys., 218 F.3d 858, 861-62 (8th Cir.
2000).
21 Duty v. Norton-Alcoa Proppants, 293 F.3d 481, 495 (8th Cir. 2002).
12 d. at 492.
213 Id. at 492, 495.
214 Tardie v. Rehab. Hosp., 168 F.3d 538, 543 (1st Cir. 1999); see also
Summers v. Middleton & Reutlinger, P.S.C., 214 F. Supp. 2d 751, 757 (W.D. Ky.
2002) (employee not ready to return at end of twelve weeks of leave).
215 Tardie, 168 F.3d at 544.
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hours is essential for the position.216 Thus, the Tardie court used the same
analysis to determine both that the employer was not required to reinstate
the employee and that the employee was not entitled to accommodation,
which would enable her to work. 17
To refuse reinstatement based on a requirement that an employee be
available to work a particular schedule, the employer must show that such
availability is essential to the position. The U.S. Postal Service showed that
such availability was essential for a part-time flexible clerk position,
despite the lack of such a requirement in the written job description and the
postal service's failure to replace that clerk for six months after he
attempted to return to work from his leave. 21 8 The court in Routes v.
Henderson gave deference to both the employer's entitlement to define the
essential functions of the position and the provision in .the applicable
collective bargaining agreement that such employees should be available
to work the hours assigned to them during a seven day service week.219
If the employer retains the burden of proof, it must establish that the
employee seeking reinstatement can no longer perform the essential job
duties. Even though the employer in Routes established that availability to
work seven days was essential, the employer failed to prove that the
employee seeking reinstatement could not perform that essential duty.
220
Rather, Routes was released to work without restriction and did not state
that he could only be available to work less than seven days per week.221
The Routes court suggests that if an employer doubts the returning
employee's ability to perform essential job duties, it should contact the
employee's health care provider to clarify the employee's ability to perform
such duties.222
Even though the FMLA does not require accommodation, the
regulations do state that a returning employee shall be given a reasonable
216 Id.; cf Nowak v. St. Rita High Sch., 142 F.3d 999, 1003-04 (7th Cir. 1998)
(high school teacher unable to regularly attend classes denied indefinite leave of
absence under ADA); Monette v. Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1186-
88 (6th cir. 1996) (customer service representative denied indefinite medical leave);
Myers v. Hose, 50 F.3d 278, 280 (4th Cir. 1995) (bus driver does not have a right
to an "indefinite period of time to correct his"-disability under the ADA). But see
Ward v. Mass. Health Research Inst., Inc., 209 F.3d 29, 35 (1st Cir. 2000)
(punctual attendance not an essential job requirement).
217 Tardie, 168 F.3d at 544.
218 Routes v. Henderson, 58 F. Supp. 2d 959, 993 (S.D. Ind. 1999).
219d.
220 id.
221 Id.
222 Id. at 993 n.20.
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opportunity to fulfill conditions of employment lost "as a result of the
leave." '223 Examples given in the regulations include inability to attend a
necessary course, renew a license, or fly a minimum number of hours.
224
This provision only allows a returning employee an opportunity to regain
qualifications lost as a result of the leave itself rather than a result of a
medical condition. For example, the plaintiff in Jewell could not take
advantage of this provision because he lost his driver's license as the result
of his medical condition, and he could not have prevented its loss by
reducing or even eliminating the time on leave.225 In contrast, the plaintiff
in Fejes v. Gilpin Ventures, Inc. had the opportunity to regain her gaming
license that expired during her leave.226 This provision does not give
employees any significant right to accommodation of their inability to
perform essential job duties.
The limited definition of disability under the ADA227 combined with
the lack of a duty to accommodate under the FMLA can leave many
employees without a right to return to work. For example, the court in
Rinehimer held that an employee was not disabled under the ADA due to
sensitivity to dust and fumes, which was neither substantially limiting nor
a temporary case of pneumonia.22' His employer did not regard him as
disabled since he was allowed to perform other work after his leave.229 Yet
his condition prevented him from performing his previous position, so he
had no right of return under the FMLA.23 °
The right to return to work under the ADA has been further limited by
the Supreme Court's interpretation of the duty to accommodate in US.
Airways, Inc. v. Barnett.3 The Barnett Court outlined the circumstances
under which an employer's obligation to retain or transfer a disabled
employee to another position is limited bythat employer's internal seniority
provisions.232 According to the Court, a request to transfer to or retain a
position is unreasonable if it requires an employer to violate its seniority
provisions. 233 A disabled employee can only force such an accommodation
223 29 C.F.R. § 825.215(b) (2003).
224 id.
225 Jewell v. Reid's Confectionary Co., 172 F. Supp. 2d 212, 220-21 (D. Me.
2001).226 Fejes v. Gilpin Ventures, Inc., 960 F. Supp. 1487, 1494 (D. Colo. 1997).
22742 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2002).
228 Rinehimer v. Cemcolift, Inc., 292 F.3d 375, 380-81 (3d Cir. 2002).
229 Id. at 381-82.
230 Id. at 384.
231 U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 122 S. Ct. 1516 (2002).
232 Id. at 1523-25.
233 Id. at 1523-24.
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by showing "special circumstances" which would require the employer to
make an exception to the seniority system, such as incorporation of other
exceptions in the system.2 34 This decision allows a disabled employee to
seek a transfer to accommodate his disability only if that employee can
show "special circumstances" that would require the employer to make an
exception to the seniority system, such as incorporation of other exceptions
in the system.
Since the ADA may not provide a right to reinstatement for employees
who do not qualify as disabled under its narrowing definition or whose
employer has adopted a policy that would prevent transfer to another
position, it becomes more important that an employee be allowed to show
that the employer's claim that he or she cannot perform the essential duties
of his or her position is pretextual. Given that opportunity, the employee
has a better chance of asserting his or her right to reinstatement even if a
medical condition limits his or her job performance in an unessential area.
VII. RETURN TO THE SAME OR EQUIVALENT WORK
If an employee is entitled to reinstatement, the employer must return
him or her to the same position held prior to taking the leave or to an
equivalent position.235 An employee states an FMLA claim if her employer
fails to return her to the same position she occupied prior to leave,
particularly where she has been cleared by her physician to perform those
duties.236 The employer's recourse is to seek additional medical opinions
to rebut the employee's certification that the employee can perform her
previous duties.237 Even though an employee retains the same pay and title,
the employee is entitled to a trial to determine whether the new position is
an "equivalent" position under the FMLA.238
If the employee's prior position no longer exists or has been filled, the
employer must find equivalent work for the employee returning from leave.
Congress intended that "equivalent" as used in the FMLA be interpreted by
referring to the definition of discrimination in terms or conditions of
employment as prohibited by Title VII.239 A change in position can
constitute an adverse action under Title VII if it results in "a decrease in
wage or salary, a less distinguished title, a material loss of benefits, [or]
234 Id. at 1525.
233 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(1) (2002).
236 See Cooper v. Olin Corp., 246 F.3d 1083, 1086, 1090-91 (8th Cir. 2001).
237 Id. at 1091.
23 Id. at 1091-92.
239 S. REP. NO. 103-3, at *3 (1993) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1993)).
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significantly diminished material responsibilities."24 Typically, an adverse
action under Title VII must result in the plaintiff's placement or retention
in a position that is objectively worse in some respect.241 For example, a
transfer into a less prestigious position could constitute an adverse action
where other employees sought to transfer out of that position and the
change was seen as a demotion.242 Similarly, courts have not recognized a
transfer as an adverse action in an ADA claim if it caused no "objective
harm" and reflected "a mere chip-on-the-shoulder complaint." '243 The focus
tends to be on whether a "reasonable person in [the employee's] position
would view the employment action in question as adverse. 244
Although the statute does not define "equivalent," the Department of
Labor has defined an equivalent position as one that is "virtually identical
to the employee's former position in terms of pay, benefits and working
conditions, including privileges, perquisites and status., 245 Some employees
have stated a claim under the FMLA because their employer did not return
them to equivalent positions. An employer who filled a gas station manager
position after its incumbent suffered a heart attack violated the FMLA for
failing to reinstate him, not because the position was filled, but because the
employer failed to find equivalent employment for the employee who took
leave. 
24 6
Summary judgment may not be granted for the employer if the facts fail
to show that the alternative position is equivalent and was offered to the
24oKindred v. Northome/Indus. Sch. Dist. No. 363, 983 F. Supp. 835, 842 (D.
Minn. 1997), aff'd, 154 F.3d 801 (8th Cir. 1998) (quoting Crady v. Liberty Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co., 993 F.2d 132, 135 (7th Cir. 1993)).
241 Craven v. Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice, 151 F. Supp. 2d 757, 766 (N.D.
Tex. 2001); see also Joiner v. Ohio Dep't of Transp., 949 F. Supp. 562, 567 (S.D.
Ohio 1996) (transfer adverse if "objectively intolerable to reasonable person")
(emphasis added).
242 LULAC Councils 4433 & 4436 v. City of Galveston, 979 F. Supp. 514,
518-19 (S.D. Tex. 1997); see also Sharp v. City of Houston, 164 F.3d 923, 933
(5th Cir. 1999) (In a § 1983 retaliation claim, a jury could consider transfer to be
demotion if position proved to be objectively worse-less prestigious, less
interesting, or less room for advancement.); Forsyth v. City of Dallas, 91 F.3d 769,
774 (5th Cir. 1996) (In a § 1983 retaliation claim, use of transfer to night patrol as
punishment made plaintiffs transfer tonight patrol adverse.).
243 Doe v. Dekalb County Sch. Dist., 145 F.3d 1441, 1453 n.21 (11th Cir.
1998).244Id. at 1449.
245 29 C.F.R. § 825.215(a) (2003).
2 Watdns v. J & S Oil Co., 164 F.3d 55, 59 (1st Cir. 1998).
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returning employee.247 The employer cannot rely on an ambiguous offer for
an "ill-defined, not yet fully conceived, and quite possibly [non]equivalent"
position.248 The court in Wilson held that the employer did not adequately
justify its failure to return Wilson to her previous position where it had
hired a replacement for her and subsequently made the replacement
permanent, yet only offered her the possibility of another position.249 Even
though Wilson offered evidence that her supervisor had made negative
comments about her pregnancy prior to the start of her leave, the court did
not consider this evidence in determining whether she was offered an
equivalent position as required by the FMLA.250
The employee should enjoy the same pay and benefits as prior to leave.
For example, there was no question that a reduction from $550 per week to
$7.00 per hour, combined with increased health insurance costs and loss of
life insurance coverage, did not constitute equivalent work.' Similarly,
pay may not be equivalent where the returning employee's per hour wage
dropped due to a loss of production incentives during training.
252
Typically, a claim for disparate treatment must establish that the action
taken was materially adverse to the employee-more disruptive "than a
mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities. 253 In contrast
to FMLA claims for reinstatement, Title VII cases have recognized that
without a reduction in pay, a transfer might not constitute an adverse
action.254 Even the reduced chance for sales for a sales person who is paid
247 Wilson v. Tarr, Inc., No. CV-99-1412-HU, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13425,
at *32 (D. Ore. 2000).
248 Id.
249 Id. at *31-39.
250 d. at *38-39.
251 Hanna v. Pay-and-Save, Inc., No. 5:00-CV-430-C, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
20095, at *2, 14 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 5, 2001).
252 Green v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 182 F. Supp. 2d 128, 138 (D.
Me. 2002).
253 Rabinovitz v. Pena, 89 F.3d 482,488 (7th Cir. 1996) (materiality shown by
demotion including decrease in salary, a less distinguished title, a material loss of
benefits, or significantly diminished material responsibilities) (quoting Crady v.
Liberty Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 993 F.2d 132, 136 (7th Cir. 1993)); see also
Cossette v. Minn. Power & Light, 188 F.3d 964,972 (8th Cir. 1999) (only adverse
with "tangible change in duties or working conditions that constitute[ ] a material
employment disadvantage" (quoting Manning v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 127 F.3d
686, 692 (8th Cir. 1997) (alteration in original))).
254 Flaherty v. Gas Research Inst., 31 F.3d 451, 456-57 (7th Cir. 1994); see
also Tyler v. Ispat Inland, Inc., 245 F.3d 969, 972 (7th Cir. 2001) (lateral transfer
without change in salary or benefits not an adverse action); Joiner v. Ohio Dep't
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partly in commission may not be able to show an adverse action, particu-
larly where the effect on the commission is a small fraction of the em-
ployee's total income.2" Yet a diminished opportunity for promotion, if
combined with other factors, may make a transfer an adverse action under
Title VII 25
Employers may wish to place an employee returning from FMLA leave
on a different shift. However, the right to an equivalent position may
include placing the returning employee on the same shift if the employee's
position has not been eliminated, even if the employee's former position
has been filled.257 Where a hospital routinely hired nurses for a particular
shift and the employee returning from leave has worked a certain shift for
over two years, the employer has not offered an equivalent position if the
returning employee is offered a different shift.25
In contrast to.courts recognizing the employee's interest in remaining
on the same shift as part of the substantive right of reinstatement, a change
in shift alone may not constitute an adverse employment action for
purposes of proving retaliation under the FMLA.259 Similarly, transfer of
an employee to a different shift may not constitute an adverse action to
support a claim for disparate treatment under Title VII, if the employee's
pay, benefits, and responsibilities remain the same.260 Yet forcing an
employee to work a split shift, along with reducing her hours and changing
her duties, can force an employer to go to trial on the issue of whether an
adverse action has been taken under the ADA.26' Thus, some courts have
of Transp., 949 F. Supp. 562, 567 (S.D. Ohio 1996) (same pay and benefits
outweighed difference in title and duties to establish lack of adverse action).
255 Williams v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 85 F.3d 270, 274 (7th Cir. 1996).
256 Stembridge v. City ofNew York, 88 F. Supp. 2d 276,283 (S.D.N.Y. 2000),
aff'd without op., No. 00-7668, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 38697 (2d Cir. Dec. 18,
2000) (adverse action shown in part by lack of promotion opportunities); Kauffman
v. Kent State Univ., 21 F.3d 428 (6th Cir. 1994) (reduction of promotion
opportunities alone did not show adverse action).
27 29 C.F.R. § 825.216(a)(2) (2001).
258 Hunt v. Rapides Healthcare Sys., LLC, 277 F.3d 757, 766-67 (5th Cir.
2001), reh 'g denied, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 5061 (5th Cir. Jan. 30, 2002).259 Id. at 769.
260 Id.; Craven v. Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice, 151 F. Supp. 2d 757, 765-66
(N.D. Tex. 2001) (failure to grant plaintiff's request for transfer to day shift was
not adverse action); see also Benningfield v. City of Houston, 157 F.3d 369, 377
(5th Cir. 1998) (In a § 1983 retaliation claim, transfer to night shift alone did not
constitute adverse action.).
261Rizzo v. Children's World Learning Ctrs., 84 F.3d 758, 765 (5th Cir. 1996)
(disabled employee defeated motion for summary judgment).
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been willing to grant an employee returning from FMLA leave more
advantages under their right to equivalent work than they might otherwise
enjoy.
Like a shift change, a reduction or change in duties can also support a
claim that the employer has not restored the employee to an equivalent
position. The Voorhees court refused to grant a summary judgment for
Time Warner after it reassigned some of its customer service manager's
duties, including supervisory responsibilities, even though the plaintiff
suffered no loss of pay or benefits.262 Similarly, the restoration of a
statistical process control coordinator to the position of "creeler" in a
manufacturing plant did not constitute restoration to a position with the
same responsibilities, skill requirements, and authority.263
In the Title VII context, courts sometimes have recognized that a
change of duties can constitute an adverse action which supports a claim of
disparate treatment or harassment. If an employee has been required to
perform more menial tasks and has less opportunity for salary increases, he
or she may have suffered an adverse action.264
Conversely, a different laundry worker position can be considered
equivalent as a matter of law.265 The Vasquez court held that even though
the position offered to the plaintiff when returning from leave involved
more standing, lifting, worse smells, and could lead to a reduction in pay
in the future, the position was sufficiently equivalent for FMLA
purposes.266 The court did not consider that this less attractive position may
have been offered to "punish" Vasquez for taking FMLA leave.
Like the Vasquez court, courts interpreting Title VII have not always
recognized an adverse action based on a change ofjob duties. A change in
duties or working conditions that does not cause any material significant
disadvantage to the employee may not constitute an adverse action to
support a disparate treatment claim.267 For example, a school custodian who
262 Voorhees v. Time Warner Cable Nat'l Div., No. 98-1460, 1999 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 13227, at *13 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 26, 1999).
263 Cross v. Southwest Recreational Indus., Inc., 17 F. Supp. 2d 1362, 1370 n. 1
(N.D. Ga. 1998).
2 McCabe v. Sharrett, 12 F.3d 1558, 1564 (1 lth Cir. 1994).
265 Vasquez v. N. Ill. Hosp. Servs., Inc., No. 00C50100, 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 5257, at *5-6 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 15, 2002).266 Id. at *5.
267 Harlston v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 37 F.3d 379, 382 (8th Cir. 1994)
(stating that reassignment to job with different duties and more stress not an
adverse action); see also Kocsis v. Multi-Care Mgmt., Inc., 97 F.3d 876, 885-86
(6th Cir. 1996) (holding that there was no adverse action where employment duties
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was, among other things, given "additional responsibilities above what was
expected of male custodians" and above what she reasonably should have
been given did not suffer an adverse employment action, even though the
assignment of extra duties could help establish sexual harassment.2 6 Yet
since the FMLA provides for a positive right of reinstatement, courts
should be wary in adopting the limited definition of an adverse action based
on a change of duties when enforcing this right.
Employers can take the returning employee's physical capabilities into
account in determining what would constitute equivalent work.2 69 The
Watkins court upheld a verdict in favor of Watkins' FMLA claim where his
employer had discussed an office job or a gas attendant job with him after
a medical condition prevented Watkins from performing the duties of store
manager.27 The court indicated that even if he could no longer perform
those duties, the other positions discussed may not have been equivalent.2 '
To avoid an obligation to reinstate an employee after FMLA leave, an
employer may sometimes argue that a position is not equivalent to avoid
restoring the employee to such a position. If the pay, benefits, and working
conditions are similar, the positions may be deemed equivalent.272 Even if
the employer claims that the position sought by the returning employee
requires additional skills, the employer cannot refuse reinstatement to that
position if other applicants have not been held to the same standard.273
An employer's intent to take an adverse action against an employee
because he or she has taken FMLA leave can be masked by the employer's
failure to return that employee to the same or equivalent work. In the Title
VII context, employees alleging that they have suffered an adverse action
can rebut the employer's legitimate business reasons for placing them in a
different position by presenting evidence that those reasons are a pretext for
were not materially modified); Kindred v. Northome/Indus. Sch. Dist. No. 363,983
F. Supp. 835, 842 (D. Minn. 1997), aff'd, 154 F.3d 801 (8th Cir. 1998) (asserting
that being given a new bus route did not change duties or responsibilities of a bus
driver).
26' Haugerud v. Amery Sch. Dist., 259 F.3d 678, 691-92, 695-96 (7th Cir.
2001).
269 Watkins v. J & S Oil Co., 164 F.3d 55, 59 (1st Cir. 1998).
271 Id. at 56-59, 62.
271 See id. at 59.
272 See Vargas v. Globetrotters Eng'g Corp., 4 F. Supp. 2d 780, 784 (N.D. Ill.
1998).
273 See id. at 782-84. The court denied the employer's summary judgment
motion based on evidence that the employer sought to hold plaintiff to a higher
standard than other applicants.
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discrimination.274 For example, the LULAC court determined that a
reasonable jury could find that the employer's reason for transferring some
Hispanic police officers to less prestigious positions was not legitimate
where the police chief had made racial jokes regularly and the transfer
policy he relied upon had not been used since it had been implemented
eleven years prior, but was subsequently used to benefit white officers.275
Since Congress intended that courts follow the Title VII analysis when
determining whether an employee has been returned to equivalent work
after FMLA leave, courts should likewise consider evidence that the
employer's reason for not offering the same or equivalent work was
pretextual. Thus, courts should not take employers' presentations about the
availability of work or the equivalence of work at face value, but should
allow a finder of fact to determine whether the employer acted in good faith
to try and return the employee to an appropriate position.
VIII. LIMITED DUTY TO REINSTATE KEY EMPLOYEES
Rather than trying to find the same or equivalent work for an employee
returning from FMLA leave, employers can refuse to reinstate certain "key
employees" to positions held prior to taking FMLA leave.276 Key employ-
ees may only include those salaried employees "among the highest paid 10
percent of the employees employed by the employer within 75 miles of the
facility at which the employee is employed. 277 However, if the employee
receives a base salary that is less than the compensation received by other
employees who are eligible for overtime, that employee may not be in the
highest ten percent.278
To be considered a key employee, an employee must fit within the
definition of a salaried employee used in applying the Fair Labor Standards
Act.279 An employee is not salaried, and therefore cannot be a key
employee, if his or her salary is not for a predetermined amount unaffected
by the number of hours worked, if the salary is subject to deductions for
214 See Kindred v. Northome/Indus. Sch. Dist. No. 363,983 F. Supp. 835, 843-
44 (D. Minn. 1997), af'd, 154 F.3d 801 (8th Cir. 1998) (employee's evidence of
pretext considered).
275 LULAC Councils 4433 & 4436 v. City of Galveston, 979 F. Supp. 514,
520-21 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (denying motion for summary judgment).276 See 29 U.S.C. § 2614(b) (2002).
271 Id. § 2614(b)(2).
271 See O'Grady v. Catholic Partners Serv., No. 00C7144, 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 2182, at *16-17 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
279 29 C.F.R. § 825.217 (2003) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 541.118 (2003)).
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absences of less than a day for personal reasons, or due to discipline or lack
of work."' Thus, if an employer deducts from an employee's pay for
personal absences of less than a day, that employee may not be classified
as a key employee.28" '
To avoid its reinstatement obligation, an employer also must establish
that the denial of reinstatement is "necessary to prevent substantial and
grievous economic injury to the operations of the employer." '282 An
employer can only deny reinstatement if the reinstatement, not the use of
leave, would cause the employer such injury.283
An employer that focuses only on the injury that would have resulted
if the employee was not replaced while on leave has not established an
injury that would justify a refusal to reinstate.284 Yet some courts focus
incorrectly on the injury that would result from the employee's leave rather
than on the injury resulting from reinstatement.285 The Kelly court granted
summary judgment for the employer because the employer had no
obligation to reinstate based on its finding that it was "reasonable for [the
employer] to believe that [Kelly's] prolonged absence could cause a
'substantial and grievous economic injury'" to that employer.286 The court
found unpersuasive Kelly's evidence that some of the employer's agents
wished to see her dismissed before the end of her leave-evidence which
could tend to show that the alleged injury was not a legitimate con-
cern.
287
If the employer cannot avoid replacing the employee while on leave,
the cost of reinstating the employee after the leave can be considered in
evaluating the economic injury to the employer.28 The regulations do not
280 Id. § 541.118(a) (2003). See also Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 460-62
(1997) (stating that an employee is not salaried if there is a significant likelihood
that pay is subject to deductions based on hours of work performed or quantity of
work performed); Takacs v. Hahn Auto. Corp., 246 F.3d 776, 781 (6th Cir. 2001),
cert. denied, 534 U.S. 889 (2001) (concluding that the practice of deductions was
shown by suspension of seven employees in eighteen months).
281 O'Grady, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2182, at *18.
282 29 U.S.C. § 2614(b)(1)(A) (2002).
283 29 C.F.R. § 825.218(a) (2003).
284 O'Grady, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2182, at *20.
285 See Kelly v. DecisionOne Corp., No. 00-CV-968, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
17508, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 6, 2000), aff'd without opin., 276 F.3d 577 (3d Cir.
2001).286 Id. at *5, 8 (emphasis added) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 825.218(b), (c)).
287 Id. at *5-6.
28829 C.F.R. § 825.218(b) (2003).
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provide a precise definition of what constitutes substantial and grievous
economic injury, but it is something more than "undue hardship" under the
ADA.2 89 Under the ADA, an undue hardship results if the accommodation
would result in significant difficulty or expense in light of the employer's
size, resources, and flexibility.290 Under the FMLA, an employer may
refuse to reinstate a key employee when there is a threat to the "economic
viability of the firm" or by proving "substantial, long-term economic
injury"; however, "[m]inor inconveniences and costs" do not satisfy the
standard.291
The employer typically carries the burden of establishing that
reinstatement would impose injury on itself. For example, a county
government failed to carry that burden to avoid its obligation to reinstate
its tax assessor. 92 Although the county showed it had reason to replace the
plaintiff while he was on leave, it failed to explain why it could not return
that employee's replacement to her prior position without sustaining injury,
given that she only had an interim appointment to the plaintiff's position.293
Under the Department of Labor's regulations, an employer can rely on
this exception to the general obligation to reinstate only if the employer
notifies an employee of their "key" status at the time leave is requested.294
This notice requirement was recognized by the court in Panza v. Grappone
Cos., even though the employer argued that it needed not give notice
because the plaintiff's position was subsequently eliminated.295 Even if the
employer can later show substantial and grievous injury, the employer must
289 Id. § 825.218(c)-(d).
290 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10) (1995); see also Buckles v. First Data Resources,
Inc., 176 F.3d 1098, 1101 (8th Cir. 1999) (concluding that the costs and
administrative burdens of creating irritant free environment would cause undue
hardship); Cehrs v. Northeast Ohio Alzheimer's Research Ctr., 155 F.3d 775, 782
(6th Cir. 1998) (asserting that the employer carries burden of showing undue
hardship); Rascon v. U.S. West Communications, Inc., 143 F.3d 1324, 1334-35
(10thCir. 1998) (indicating that undue hardship not established by employer's need
to cover duties of employee on leave); Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep't of Admin., 44
F.3d 538, 543 (7th Cir. 1995) (showing that a court may compare hardship to the
benefits of accommodation to the employee).
291 29 C.F.R. § 825.218(c) (2003).
292 Kephart v. Cherokee County, No. 99-1789,2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 18924,
at * 18-20 (4th Cir. Aug. 4, 2000) (reversal of summary judgment).
193 Id. at *20-21.
294 29 C.F.R. § 825.219(a).
29 Panza v. Grappone Cos., No. 99-221-M, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16390, at
*4-5 (D.N.H. 2000).
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reinstate if such notice was not given.2 96 Thus, if an employer fails to
inform an employee that his or her position is key at the time he or she
requests leave, the employer cannot avoid reinstatement under Section
2614(b).297
Notice of an employee's classification as a "key" employee must be
clear. For example, an optometrist who was told that she had "nothing to
worry about" with respect to her position, that her replacement was only
temporary, and who was given FMLA forms while being told that she
might not be offered job restoration did not have clear notice that she might
be denied job restoration.298
Although courts have placed the burden on employers to show that a
position is equivalent and that an employee occupies a "key" position,
employees seeking to challenge an employer's refusal to reinstate to an
equivalent or key position should still have the opportunity to present
evidence of an employer's intent to discriminate on the basis of an
employee's use of leave. For example, an employer opposed to an em-
ployee's use of FMLA leave could create a situation where no equivalent
work exists by eliminating the employee's position while he or she is on
leave. The employee should be able to challenge that employer's refusal to
reinstate not only in a retaliation claim, but also as a means of refuting the
employer's justification for denying the positive right of reinstatement.
CONCLUSION
Since the FMLA's passage almost ten years ago, courts' interpretation
of an employee's right of reinstatement has limited that right by placing the
burden on employees to prove that the employer did not have a legitimate
reason to refuse reinstatement. Even if a court appropriately places that
burden on the employer to defend its failure to reinstate the employee, other
courts have limited consideration of proof that the reason offered by the
employer is really a pretext for adverse treatment based on the employee's
use of FMLA leave.
To fulfill its promise to provide leave for employees to care for
themselves or others, the FMLA should be interpreted to allow an
employee a more meaningful right of reinstatement after taking FMLA
296 Id.; see also 29 C.F.R. § 825.219(a); The Family and Medical Leave Act of
1993, 60 Fed. Reg. 2180, 2217 (Feb. 6, 1995) (asserting that failure to provide
timely notice of key employee status results in loss of right to deny restoration,
even if substantial and grievous economic injury will result from the restoration).297 See Panza, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16390, at * 5.
298 Thomas v. Pearle Vision, Inc., 251 F.3d 1132, 1140 (7th Cir. 2001).
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leave. Without a job to return to, FMLA leave is nothing more than the
right to quit. The courts can fulfill this promise by interpreting the FMLA's
positive right of reinstatement as the rule rather than the exception and by
adhering to the Department of Labor's placement of the burden on the
employer to establish an exception to that right. Moreover, even though
intent is not an element of entitlement to this right, employees who have
taken leave should be given the opportunity to establish that the employer's
proffered reason for not reinstating the employee is a pretext for denying
the right because the employee has taken FMLA leave. Only then will
employees enjoy a meaningful right to reinstatement as envisioned by the
FMLA.

